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Abstract
The 'deficiency model' of aging has often been criticized for its lack of attention to
the individual patient's narrative understanding of his own life. However, such
narrative conceptions tend to focus on a generic adult person, situated in specific
on-going projects and relationships, moving toward a more or less clear
conception of the future. What interest me, on the other hand, are those
individuals who have become aware of their own death as imminent, and who
therefore strive to compose the 'last chapter' of their life story. Imminence is not
to be taken in chronological or clinical terms, but as revealing an attitude to
oneself and one's own life. The composition of the last chapter requires
recollecting and reappraising the events of one's life in an effort to make sense of
the life as a whole. I propose revising the ancient Greek word eudaemonia to
capture this sense of achieving an integrated meaning to one's life.
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Eudaemonia in the Lives of the Terminally Ill
The goals of medicine in the face of biological aging should be, above all, to target
those physical and mental conditions that tend to rob old age of human meaning and
social significance. Medicine cannot create that meaning, which must come from
individual reflection and social policy and practices. (Callahan 1994 p. 41)
These are the words of Daniel Callahan. In this article, I am less interested in Callahan's
proposed changes to social policy and practice, and more in the 'individual reflection'
mentioned above; especially that type of reflection peculiar to the final stages of life. But
understanding individual reflection properly will require a discussion of human meaning
and social significance, and the role of such significance in the dying patient's reflection.
Despite their enormous diversity of personalities and backgrounds, the elderly are all
too often united in discussions about healthcare policy into a single class on the basis of
biological ageing, sometimes called the 'deficiency model' (Schmid, 1991). Certain
physiological functions decline in a given individual in predictable ways, and it will
require resources to care, treat, and manage the decline as best as possible. Old age is
a mirror image of infancy because of the return to physical vulnerability and
dependency, and in some cases, to the same kind of incompetence.
Such a classification, as heretofore described, is certainly understandable for a
healthcare policy analyst or manager. In basing the classification on deficiency;
however, I submit that the class implicitly includes other individuals with long-term
deficiencies such as children and the handicapped. But the elderly are importantly
different from these two other classes because they are at the end of their lives. Even if
they are not able-bodied now, most of them have been in the past; but more than just
able-bodied, they have lived rich lives full of projects and relationships. Obviously, any
decent care of the elderly requires some interest in their biographies. However, such an
interest is required for all patients whatever their age or prognosis. With the elderly, the
individual's location in life, the fact that they are looking back on their biography, is just
as important as the content of the biography. I want to suggest that this location, last
chapter of the story," (Brody 2003 p. 254), is the source of the peculiar vulnerability to
humiliation suffered by the elderly; especially in institutional healthcare.
In explaining this, I shall make use of the ancient Greek concept of eudaemonia, which
is all too often mistranslated as happiness. This elderly person is not just at the end of
life, but at the end of his life, and he is therefore concerned to write the last chapter of
the story of his life. As any book-reader knows, the last chapter is not merely the final
series of events, but it wraps up the story, and may do so more or less satisfactorily. No
matter how enjoyable the story might have been to read through chapter by chapter, it is
possible to spoil a book by a bad ending. It is the last chapter, and the effort to write it,
that best characterizes the elderly.
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What do I mean by 'elderly', since of course "you're only as old as you feel"? The
concept is necessarily vague, and has little to do with chronological age or medical
prognosis: there is always room for hope, however slim, and there is always room for
defiant self-deception. Instead, I have in mind those people who are aware at a suitably
deep level that allows for no further self-deception that the end is nigh, and who are
preparing themselves for it bravely and responsibly. How nigh is again impossible to
define; but there will be a moment where the person realizes that it is simply time to
start preparing for the inevitable. Such preparations are certainly compatible with
continuing delight in one's day-to-day living, and with looking forward to events in the
weeks and months to come; there need be no bitterness or defeatism in the
preparations. This paper will explore the nature of such preparations, phrased in terms
of writing the final chapter and seeking eudaemonia. I shall not be getting into thorny
questions of when to withdraw treatment or when to make strenuous efforts to prolong
life, although what I say will have clear implications for such a debate.
EUDAEMONIA
The concept of eudaemonia does not seem to have much currency in medical ethics
today, let alone in modern philosophy. There is an English word 'happiness' into which
the Greek word is widely translated, which has played a key role in the development of
utilitarianism and which retains pride of place in the Declaration of Independence. But
happiness is too thin and too vague to suffice as a translation, and it has unwelcome
connotations of subjectivity, as can be seen in the vapid response: "Whatever makes
you happy, dear."
Sometimes eudaemonia is translated as 'flourishing', which is an improvement because
it has a wider temporal scope, a greater engagement with objective facts about the
quality of one's life, and a greater complexity than mere happiness
(http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/aristotle-ethics). Nevertheless, it remains too
limited to suffice as a full translation because it remains essentially occurrent. I am
flourishing now, but there is no necessary reference to whether my life as a whole was
flourishing. My present flourishing is compatible with an unexpected reversal of fortune,
or with the discovery of facts that would radically undermine the value of my present
commitments. It is this reference to one's life as a whole that is a key to understanding
eudaemonia. Insofar as the future remains open, it is hard to tell how worthwhile the life
as a whole will be. As such, eudaemonia is something that can only be acquired and
observed at the end of a life, once the story has been written and all the pieces are in
place. (Strictly speaking, a person's eudaemonia does not end entirely with his death.
One's achievement as a parent, for example part of one's eudaemonia will be partly
revealed by the behavior of one's offspring after one's death.)
A closer translation at this point might be 'reputation', but on its own that is too
pragmatic. A reputation is something that I seek to acquire as a means to doing other
things, such as business. Eudaemonia cannot be so instrumental since the dead person
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does not stand to benefit at all. But 'reputation' is partly correct in allowing the survival of
the reputation beyond the death of its owner.
I think the best translation is simply 'good life story'. It is the story that others will tell
about me after I have gone, a story that accurately captures me as a person, as well as
the projects and relationships to which I contributed and which partly constituted me as
a person. It is a story with familiar requirements of coherence and integrity, and it is a
story with clear chapters; the one emerging out of the preceding one, and leading
toward a final chapter which wraps the story up satisfactorily.
This narrative conception of life is hardly new. What is often neglected in narratives
discussions, however, are the elderly person's specific location in the story and his
relation to that story. I'm interested in that person's experience of looking back over his
life, and in his efforts to make sense of it by writing the final chapter.
NARRATIVE AND SIGNIFICANCE
The patient's narrative understanding of his illness, i.e. the way that the illness is
experienced within the context of his on-going life, is now widely recognized as
important to medical ethics (Charon &Montello 2002; Nelson, 1997). Let me recap
something of the narratives critique of the conception of the self-presupposed by most
debates in medical ethics. Liberalism tends to conceive all competent adults as a single
class, and in many ways this is a good thing. A competent 98-year-old has exactly the
same right to vote, marry and buy property as an 18-year-old; and in both cases it will
be up to the state to justify any restrictions on such a right. As such, it doesn't matter, in
the narrow sense that it is not the state's business to ask, who or what the person is.
Strictly speaking, the person's biographical history, as well as his present commitments
and plans for the future, are irrelevant to the individual rights which characterize his
relations with the state, and by extension, with any large institution (such as healthcare
facilities) regulated by the state.
As has now been recognized by many, the combination of the thin liberal account and
physiological deficiency model cannot adequately account for the more complicated
lives of real people. There is no room for the individual's personal narrative as a source
of integrity and identity as structuring the elderly patient's point of view on the world;
including his point of view on any care and treatment he is being offered. Such integrity
and identity also grounds the particular kind of dignity possessed by the elderly (in the
sense of their particular vulnerability to humiliation), above and beyond the general
dignity ascribed by liberalism to all human beings.
The complicated lives of real people are lived in medias res (in the midst of things); they
essentially find themselves in certain on-going narratively-structured projects and
relationships, on their way from their past toward their conception of the future. Such
projects and relationships will themselves derive part of their determinate meaning from
the meta-narrative structures that define certain institutions and communities. So a
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marriage between two people will best be conceived in terms of a narrative through
time, and that narrative will itself make necessary reference to the narrative of marital
traditions in that community.
The past and the future in question provide much of the meaning to the individual's
present options, dilemmas and choices. Most 'narratives' accounts, however, focus on
the lives of generic adults, where the individual still has a future. There has been
comparatively little discussion of how the deep awareness of inevitable death, for those
who are so aware of it, radically changes one's attitude toward one's life: both the life
experienced in the present and the life remembered from the past.
The last chapter is about preparing for death; certainly about putting one's affairs in
order, making a will, expressing gratitude and apologies, and saying goodbye. But the
last chapter is also about recapitulating the events of one's life, and striving to make
sense of them. I submit, this is much more than just recalling the event, and, say, taking
pleasure in the recollection: it is more to do with trying to fit it into the life story by
making use of the more objective perspective available at the end of the story.
Consider the following narrative as an example. Let's say I met my future wife on a
summer's day at the Edinburgh Theatre Festival in 1980. I then married her in 1985,
and we both fondly remembered the first meeting in Edinburgh. Then things went
wrong. I divorced her in 1990 and cursed that day in Edinburgh. Five years after the
divorce, I come to think that we both tried our best to make the marriage work, but it
was simply not to be. There were some good times and my memory of the Edinburgh
meeting might now be described as bittersweet.
Now throughout the period from 1980 to 1995, the facts of the matter have not changed,
but the significance has. Facts can be corroborated: I can check the color of her dress
from a photograph I still have, I can check the title of the performance we say on a
particular date by looking through archives, and I can therefore correct my memory. In
other words, my memories of the facts of an event are answerable to the truth. The
precise significance of an event, on the other hand, will depend on my precise location
in my life's journey, and on the context of that location, since I will be looking at the
event from that location. 'Location' has a broad scope to include all my projects,
relationships, concerns of that moment, as well as the route by which I got to this
location. Perhaps, in order to see the event in a bittersweet hue, I already had to go
through the 'sweet' and the 'bitter' phases.
There is no correct understanding of the significance in the sense that there can be a
correct understanding of the facts. Within my life, the only significance the events can
have is the significance they do have for me. In saying this I quickly have to guard
against four misunderstandings. First, even if the only relevant significance is the
significance-for-me, this does not mean that such significance is subjective; I discover
the significance, and cannot make events signify anything I want (although there is
some room for giving or withholding the benefit of the doubt). Second, even if the only
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relevant significance is the significance-for-me, this does not mean that I am impervious
to persuasion by others, to accounts of conflicting significance offered to me by others,
and to changes in the significance emerging from my own reflection on what happened.
Third, although there is no absolutely objective significance, my understanding of the
significance of the event is still partly constrained by the facts of what happened, by
general rules of coherence and consistency with the rest of my memories; and by
general rules of human behavior. Within such constraints, however, there will remain
wide room for a shifting significance of the same event. Fourth and finally, it may seem
that if the significance can shift, and there is no absolute significance, then the
significance is arbitrary: that it doesn't really matter what the event signifies, since the
significance might shift by the next year. This is misguided because it matters to the
individual whose memories they are, and there is nothing arbitrary about the event as
experienced in recollection.
THE COMPOSITION OF THE LAST CHAPTER
This business of shifting significance obviously goes on throughout one's life. But, what
is distinctive about the last chapter in the story is that many such events can be reevaluated at once, such that the recollected significance of one event will affect the
recollected significance of another as they come to fit into the big picture. It is worth
stressing that such a big picture could be positive or negative in tone: I could recall an
event and forgive my enemy, or I could send him back to hell with renewed vigor. There
is no necessary reason why the deep awareness of one's own death should inspire
humility and charity over smugness and Schadenfreude (malicious satisfaction received
from the misfortune of others).
Writing the last chapter therefore involves rewriting the chapters before it. This sounds
dangerously like self-serving rationalizations to hide a guilty conscience, but it need not
be. I will address this danger below. Instead, it can be compared to the healthy practice
of a novelist revising the body of his book in the light of his knowledge of the whole, a
knowledge he could only glean as he nears the end. The novelist may have a rough
idea of the plot when he starts out, but inevitably things will turn out differently as a
result of the sheer momentum of partly-independent characters and events. Then, he
will go back and revise the earlier chapters to give a better structure to the whole.
Similarly, the reader's experience of earlier chapters will be subtly altered by completing
the book. In the crudest detective novels, for example, certain events or utterances, at
the time apparently benign, will come to assume monstrous significance when the
murderer's identity is revealed at the end, to which the typical response is "of course, I
should have seen that."
There is nothing more frustrating than getting absorbed in a book and then finding the
final pages missing. The completion of the story has a much greater importance than
merely confirming the reader's hope that the protagonists will live happily ever after.
Instead, it gives a meaning to the whole story, making it greater than the sum of its
parts. Similarly, if the final pages are intact, but the conclusion disappoints, we speak of
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the end 'spoiling' the story. The text on the pages comprising the bulk of the book has
not changed, of course, and still holds the same capacity to delight the reader reading it
for the first time. But the ending spoils the whole, and affects the memories I retain of
the book as an entirety.
Perhaps this discussion is too metaphorical, so let me come back to a specific example
of a dying person. Ronald Dworkin considers the subtle difference between a dying
patient holding on until a particular event and holding on for that event. The former
attitude is merely temporal, and involves enduring in one's struggle with deteriorating
body. The latter attitude confirms "the critical importance of the values it identifies to the
patient's sense of his own integrity, to the special character of his life." If I have always
been attached to my family and to family events, for example, there will be a special
urgency in being kept alive long enough to learn of the birth of a healthy grandchild.
Conceiving of such an event as "salient for death," says Dworkin, confirms the
importance of all such events in the person's life (Dworkin 1993 p. 212). Of course the
person had experiences of family life that were enjoyed, appreciated and recollected in
their own right. But it is this last wish which ties together all the individual experiences
into a satisfying ending of the story of a particular person, a person partly defined by the
long-standing value that his family played in his life. The longing to hear the news of the
healthy grandchild naturally emerges from the recollection and reappraisal of all the
events in the person's relationships with his family.
THE RISK OF SELF-DECEPTION
It could be objected that my account of the final chapter leaves too much room for selfdelusion. A classic example might be King Lear's mistaken confidence that his
daughters Goneril and Regan loved him as much as they said they did. In Lear's case,
his self-delusion certainly did exacerbate his tragedy. Similarly, if I choose to forgive my
ex-wife as part of the composition of my final chapter, this could also be self-delusional
in that it might not be my place at all to forgive her; instead, maybe it is I who should
make special efforts to seek her out and beg her forgiveness. However accurate to the
facts (I am assuming that both examples can plausible allow for these interpretations)
and coherent my final story might be (the four qualifications I listed above), it could be
resting on big lies at its core.
I have three responses to this worry. The first involves a reiteration of my point about
the absence of any absolute significance. When considering the possibility of selfdeception during the composition of the last chapter, it is important to remember that the
past events are no longer directly accessible. Again, there may be facts of the matter to
which any account will be answerable; but two people can find incompatible
significances in a single fact without the implication that at least one of them is
misremembering the fact. Such a conception of significance then means that any
accusation of self-deception will be necessarily embodied; that is, made by one specific
person to another specific person within a specific context. The accuser will compare
his understanding of the fact with his understanding of the other's understanding of the
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fact. Nothing in what I have said implies that the composition of the final chapter is
impenetrable to challenge by relevantly knowledgeable others. The accuser may be
able to explain to the accused why his account is self-deceiving; but there is no
guarantee that such efforts will succeed, even when the accused is as open-minded
and good-willed as the accuser could wish.
Second, it is worth remembering that the intuitive badness of self-delusion is essentially
forward-looking, as much as one's identification with the projects and commitments that
give one's on-going life meaning. Within my own perspective on my life, I can be
concerned for the truth because such concern will help me to avoid disappointment later
on. If, however, there is to be no 'later on', then there will be no consequences of
'getting it wrong' in the sense of which self-delusion is normally presented as a danger.
Sometimes, during the composition of the last chapter, I may be genuinely unsure about
the significance of an event; in which case I may have to 'plump' for a given
interpretation and see it through: such plumping may be vulnerable to accusations of
self-deception. (I borrow the term from Simon Blackburn (1996), who uses it in a
different but not unrelated discussion.)
Third and finally, there is an important sense in which I can say: so what if he is selfdeceiving himself in the composition of the last chapter? Indeed, for many people a
certain amount of self-deception is surely essential to writing the final chapter with any
degree of optimism that one's life has amounted to anything. After all, this is the result of
all one's labors: this undignified decline of body and mind, the abandonment of family
and the death of friends, and the sheer corrosive boredom and loneliness of long-term
geriatric care. This would be bad enough in the middle of a life; it is appalling at the end
of one. Self-deception in the sense that interests me is compatible with a clear-eyed
effort to do justice to the people in one's past relationships.
CONCLUSION
The mere composition of a story, however, does not seem to provide the depth and
richness and the importance that a person's life can have for that person. After all, in
some contexts; a story is merely a story, a bloodless distraction from real life. Whereas,
my focus has been very much on the real life in the importation of the term,
eudaemonia. One advantage of this term over 'narrative', again, is that the latter can be
applied essentially to any period in one's life. Eudaemonia is something that has to be
achieved at the end of a life, when there is no further possibility for adversity that might
undermine the holistic meaning of the life. The second advantage of the Greek concept
is revealed by attending to the translation 'flourishing'. For in trying to achieve
eudaemonia in the final stage of my life, I am not merely creating a coherent story for
others, I am trying to flourish in the process of doing so. This requires more than the
mere creation of the story; it also requires an intimate identification with the story, a
blurring of the distinction between me and my story, and a final drive to live the story in
full awareness of its partly-discovered and partly-assembled meaning. Above all,
eudaemonia is about meaningfulness: what did this person's life mean? Who was he?
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